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Abstract 
The last decade was marked by an astonishing increase of the importance of Internationalization in each 
companies’ lives which directly lead to a complementary increase of the number of cross-border Merger 
and Acquisitions (M&A) all over the world. Moreover, it was emerging countries, just as China, with 
the intent of strengthening their influential place in the world, that are leading this trend of international 
acquisitions.  
Several researchers have deepened their investigation into this era of M&A to better understand their 
motives, their consequences and, above all, to better understand the impact that being acquired may 
have on a company cycle. In addition, a stream of literature has focused their studies into the cultural 
differences as a key factor on the previously mentioned impact. Nevertheless, from the studies that 
surfaced, there is no consensus on this theme among the various authors. 
In light of the existent disagreement of conclusions and to fill the gap in the existent literature, the 
present dissertation conducted its analysis concentrating on European companies that were bought by 
Chinese groups and the impact that the clash of cultures does have on the acquired company’s 
performance.  
Such assessment was based on the examination of the Assets, Sales and Return on Assets (ROA) from 
84 European M&A deals taken by China during 2007 to 2013. Furthermore, it was included a group of 
another 84 companies similar to the first ones with the unique difference of not being acquired by a 
Chinese player. This control group was included in order to understand if by being acquired by a 
Chinese company instead of remaining non-participated resulted in different performance paths. 
In the end, three main conclusions were drawn: first, companies acquired by Chinese players assist to a 
higher growth of their assets and their sales in the following years of the acquisition in comparison to 
the control group; second, the aggregated cultural difference measured against China does have a 
significant impact on the assets growth, sales growth and ROA change; third, assets growth is positively 
affected by the difference in Masculinity indicator, sales growth is negatively affected by the difference 
in Long Term Orientation indicator and ROA change is positively affected by Individualism and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint indicators and negative affected by Uncertainty Avoidance. 
 
JEL-codes: F23, F60, G34, M14 
Key words: Internationalization, China, Merger&Acquisitons, Culture Differences 
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Resumo 
A última década foi marcada por um singular crescimento da importância da Internacionalização na 
vida das empresas o que levou a um crescimento complementar do número de Aquisições 
Transfronteiriças em todo o mundo. Para além disso, são países em vias de desenvolvimento, como a 
China, que, com o intuito de fortalecerem a sua influência global, lideram esta onda de aquisições 
internacionais. 
Vários investigadores aprofundaram o estudo desta era de Aquisições e Fusões com o objetivo de 
entenderem os seus motivos, as suas consequências, mas, essencialmente, para perceberem o impacto 
que uma aquisição pode ter na vida de uma empresa. Paralelamente, a literatura incidiu os seus estudos 
nas diferenças culturais como um fator chave no impacto anteriormente referido. Todavia, da literatura 
existente, reduzidos são os estudos que permitem concluir algo sem contradizer conclusões 
anteriormente elaboradas por outros investigadores, provando, assim, o caráter controverso deste tema. 
Com o objetivo de ultrapassar as contradições e as lacunas da literatura existente, a presente dissertação 
conduz a sua análise concentrando o estudo em empresas europeias que foram adquiridas por grupos 
chineses e o impacto que tem o choque de culturas na performance da empresa adquirida. 
Tal pesquisa é baseada na observação do crescimento dos Ativos, das Vendas e da variação da 
Rentabilidade dos Ativos de 84 aquisições europeias pela China durante 2007 a 2013. Foi também 
incluído neste estudo um outro grupo de 84 empresas similares em tudo às primeiras, com a única 
exceção de não terem sido adquiridas por grupos chineses. Este grupo de controlo foi acrescentado 
com o objetivo de se perceber se uma empresa europeia pelo facto de ser adquirida por um grupo 
chinês, em vez de permanecer não participada por capitais chineses, tem uma evolução diferente na sua 
performance. 
No final, partindo dos resultados obtidos, podem ser retiradas três conclusões preponderantes: 1) as 
empresas adquiridas por chineses veem o crescimento dos seus ativos e das suas vendas crescer mais 
nos anos seguintes ao da aquisição, do que veriam se a sua empresa tivesse permanecido não adquirida; 
2) a diferença cultural agregada tem um impacto significativo no crescimento dos ativos, das vendas e 
da variação da rentabilidade dos ativos; 3) o crescimento dos ativos é positivamente afetado pela variável 
cultural Masculinidade; o crescimento das vendas é negativamente afetado pela variável cultural 
Orientação a Longo Prazo e a variação da rentabilidade do ativo é positivamente afetada pelo 
Individualismo e Indulgência e negativamente afetada pela Aversão à Incerteza. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
We live in an era where Internationalization is an essential topic for any business. Companies 
today cannot decide not to follow the thread of globalization by focusing in their own 
domestic market. Each day that passes, the wall, which used to divide “domestic” and 
“foreign” is getting thinner and thinner, and once it breaks, the market will become one only. 
More than a question of thriving, internationalization is a question of company survival.  
Moreover, the eagerness of expanding and exploring the foreign markets by big company 
groups led to what is now one of the biggest phenomena of today’s world - the Cross-Border 
Acquisitions. This can be defined as “the combination of two or more companies settled in 
different countries into one new company or corporation” (DePamphilis, 2001). 
In spite of the increasing importance of this topic, gaps of knowledge still remain, for 
instance, about what happens after a company is acquired by a group from another continent. 
This is the reason why more studies into this matter have to be done, not only to understand 
the implications of such an important process but also - and mainly - to fully understand 
what happens after.  
Taking this into account, we propose to study - the impact on cultural differences on Cross-
Border Acquisitions. Furthermore, in order to guarantee the coherency and accuracy of this 
paper, we decided to narrow this topic by investigating the impact on European companies 
acquired between 2007 to 2014 by Chinese companies. The reason for choosing China is due 
to the amount of European-based companies (from all sectors such as food distribution, 
energy, IT,...) that have been acquired by Chinese companies since the very beginning of the 
21st century. In addition, according to what Xian (2016) wrote in an article for the “China 
Daily”, 72% of Chinese companies said they planned to make a foreign acquisition over the 
next three years. 
Therefore, we intend to analyze and compare the operating performance of the companies 
from before being acquired to the following 3-years period after the Cross-Border 
acquisition. To do so, we will focus, among others, on the ROAs and its evolution before 
and after the acquisition, as also as, the evolution of sales and of assets. Then, with all this 
data, collected through Amadeus database, we intend to explain and relate the conclusions 
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achieved with the type of country from which the company was bought to evaluate if there 
is some cultural explanation for the thrive or collapse of the company. Besides, we intend to 
relate specifically towards a cultural difference. Something that can be measured, something 
that can be seen and studied when analyzing the possibilities of acquisitions in a group of 
countries. Our goal is to create a model to facilitate and support the decisions of international 
groups when they decide to invest abroad.  
Consequently, in the end and focusing on the conclusions extracted from this paper, our 
objective is to be able to properly forecast the changes in a company’s life when it is bought 
by an international group and to predict which type of company a group has to buy in order 
to maximize its possibility of creating value. 
The structure of this study proceeds as follow. After this Introduction, a Literature Review, 
with the main issues of this paper, is revised in the chapter 2. In chapter 3 the methodology 
and the sample are described with the presentation of the conclusions from the univariate 
analysis in chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the multivariable analysis used in this dissertation 
and its conclusions are discussed in chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 puts forward the 
dissertation’s main conclusions, limitations and paths for future research.  
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2. Literature Review 
Inward and outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been playing a major role in the 
development of our global economy. Even though the highest peak was in pre-crisis in 2007 
with $2.1 trillion dollars (UNCTAD, 2016), global forecasts state that FDI will increase from 
$1.8 trillion in 2017 to $1.9 trillion in 2018 overcoming, in this way, the political instability 
and conflicts between major powerful countries and the uncertain policies from governments 
towards FDI (UNCTAD, 2017). This can be explained by the fact that in 2016, dozens of 
countries adopted 124 national investment measures – the highest since 2006 – in which 
most of those, the objective was to encourage and prioritize the foreign investment. 
Nevertheless, about 1/5 of the measures countries took, introduced new investment 
restrictions or regulations which were mainly directed to avoid the control of key firms by 
foreign investors takeovers (UNCTAD, 2017). This percentage of 20% of restrictive 
regulations is still one of the highest since the beginning of internationalization in the year 
2000.  
Keeping these uncertainty policies pro and counter the international investment flow in 
mind, which were a result of the political changes happening in the world like Brexit, the 
elections in Europe and Trump’s Administration decision to abandon the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and renegotiate key trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), have all increased the world uncertainty, making us understand how 
volatile the investment environment is in the world.  
Moreover, according to UNCTAD Global Investment Report 2017, in the case of FDI 
inflows, 59% hold steady going to developed countries headed by United States. However, 
thanks to the good economic situation most Asian countries are living, China and Hong 
Kong are growing the interest and confidence of international investors increasing, therefore, 
their attraction of global investments by 15% more when compared to 2016. 
On the other hand, when analyzing FDI outflow (UNCTAD, 2017) we realize that as a 
consequence of the depreciation of national currencies and the declining commodity prices, 
there was a decrease in 2015 in most of developing regions. Yet, China did not follow the 
decrease of the other Asian countries and kept its outward FDI high rising from $123 billion 
to $128 billion achieving, therefore, the position of the 3rd biggest source of FDI in the 
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world right after US and Japan (OECD, 2016). In the next year of 2016, China maintained 
its international position as source of FDI with an increase of 43% which result in an FDI 
outflow of $183 billion (UNCTADSTAT, 2017). 
In conclusion, FDI remains the largest and most constant external source of finance for 
developing economies (UNCTAD, 2017). 
2.1. Important Definitions about Merger and Acquisitions 
According to Ghauri and Buckley (2003), we can define Merge as a combination of assets of 
two separate and independent firms into a single new one, different from the two in the 
beginning.  
On the other hand, they define Acquisition as the seizing of one company’s assets (the 
acquired) by another company (the acquirer) which will absorb the former’s assets and will 
continue to exist, while the acquired vanishes.  
However, a Merger and Acquisition (M&A) process is not easy at all. It requires careful 
planning, competent professionals assisting the target company, and an understanding of the 
deal dynamics involved in the negotiations (Harroch, 2015). Moreover, it involves deep 
concerns in a “Pre-M&A” period (number 1 to 4 in Figure 1) with the valuation and the 
motivation for such process and, in the end, in a “Post-M&A” stage (number 5 in Figure 1), 
the question of integration and performance evaluation which, in most of the times, can be 
resolved only with a significant temporal delay as a result of the inefficiency of the labour 
and capital market (Ghauri and Buckley, 2003). 
Source: A.T. Kearney Merger’s analysis  
Figure 1: Key Activities along the M&A life cycle 
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2.2. Types of M&A  
Nahass and Suidam, for the international audit company PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 
defined, in their 2017 M&A Integration Survey Report, four different types of acquisitions 
deals behind M&A: the Transformational type, when the acquisition deals involves acquiring 
new markets, channels, products, or operations in a way that is transformative to the fully 
integrated organization. Then the Absorption type (sometimes called Consolidation type), 
when the deals involve acquiring and integrating similar companies as their own, such as 
industry competitors; the Tuck-in type, when the deals involve acquiring and integrating 
relatively small companies, generally to pick up key products or technologies; and Stand-
alone type, when the deals involve acquiring but not integrating per se, this type of acquisition 
keeps the newly acquired entity operationally separate from the rest of the organization. 
2.3. Factors to consider when starting a M&A process 
A.T. Kerney, a Global Management Consulting Firm, define five overreaching areas needed 
in order to have a more successful process of M&A:  
 Internal Capabilities – first, while starting to think about adopting a M&A strategy, a 
company has to make an internal assessment of its capability of dealing with the 
business and operational risks connected to a M&A. Also, it is required for that future 
acquirer company to be ready to integrate the two companies and to capture the 
synergies. 
 Strategic goals and alignment – then, the acquirer company has to evaluate its 
financial and strategic capacity to understand which course is more advisable for the 
company to take – whether if it is, in fact, an acquisition, or, if it is better and safer, 
a normal organic growth.  
 Selection criteria – AT Kerney states that if a company only evaluates its financial 
criteria that will not be sufficient to guarantee a successful M&A. Evaluations of Cost 
Reduction, Synergy opportunities, post-acquisition market share, business unit 
turnaround and cultural fit are major elements to analyse. 
 Target selection – if the company establishes explicitly and transparently the criteria 
consistent with the company’s strategic objectives, the emergence of the right target 
firm comes easily, and it will facilitate the M&A process. 
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 Synergies and value creation - there has to be an accurate estimation of strategic value 
that can be extracted in a post-M&A period. Also, in order to convince the 
shareholders to take that action or in order to attract more investment, an evaluation 
of the creation of synergies after the acquisition is an essential factor. 
2.4. Mergers and Acquisitions in the Developing World 
In the past years, M&A have been the most important factor of the increasing tendency of 
Foreign Direct Investment (UNCTAD, 2016). 
A.T. Kearney’s study came to contradict the previous established thought that M&A were 
initiated by companies in the developed world towards other developed economies or 
developing ones. It came to the conclusion that from 2002 onwards, the number of deals 
between developing and developed countries grew at an annual rate of 19% and those deals 
actually were made four times faster. If we analyse 2007, the year when Mergers and 
Acquisitions reached a peak, from the 2168 majority acquisitions, 20% of it were driven by 
companies from countries like China, India, Malaysia, Russia and the United Arab Emirates. 
This comes to verify the findings done by A.T. Kearney: M&A are creating pressure on the 
developed world because of the incidence from developing countries by emancipating its 
companies into a global level overthrowing the pre-established developed countries, which 
were there before. 
2.5. A third wave of M&A  
Since we had already had two major waves of M&A in the world – the first between 1970s 
and mid-80s and the second between late 80s and 90s – we can now speak about a 3rd wave, 
which have begun in the late 90s up until today. This wave is characterized by the strength 
and the increase of prevalence of Emerging Economies’ Transnational Companies in the 
world of investments and acquisitions (Rasiah and Gammeltoft, 2009).  
However, one result of this advance of developing countries in the world of FDI was the 
government restrictions adopted by developed countries in order to protect their own 
interests from the emerging economies presence in their territory and in their major energetic 
and financial firms. International investment and M&A started, therefore, to be analyzed, 
also as a political move from countries like China, Russia, India to increase their power over 
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the developed countries who used to be the unequivocal leaders of FDI, like the US, Canada, 
Germany or Japan (Sauvant, 2009). 
China was, in fact, the country where this emergence within the international world was most 
significant with an increase from $26 billion in 2007 to $52 billion in 2008 (Sauvant, 2009) 
and with a critical significance in the economic world such as being one of the most 
important capital providers to developing countries in Africa in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2007). 
Moreover, in 2016 had already reached an amount of $108 billion expended in FDI 
(UNCTAD, 2017). 
2.6. China’s emergence in Internationalization  
According to Chung and Alcácer (2002), foreign direct investment is the most effective way 
of accessing strategic assets. Strategic assets can be defined as ‘‘the set of difficult to trade 
and imitate, scarce, appropriable and specialized resources and capabilities that bestow the 
firm’s competitive advantage’’ (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993, p. 36, emphasis original). 
Therefore, China with its deep investment in this international strategy became, since 1990’s, 
the emerging economy with the largest FDI outflow with the primary motivation of acquiring 
those unique assets (UNCTAD, 2017) such as reputation, tacit knowledge, buyer-supplier 
relationships, brand name, legitimacy, prestige, human capital, technologies. All of those are 
factors that China, due to its institutional pressure and cultural cognitive influences does not 
have on its own, neither the possibility to develop in the needed time. Therefore, China has 
one single option: to acquire companies in countries with the assets in need to rapidly enter 
new markets and achieve a better level of competition (Makino et al., 2002). By doing so, 
Chinese firms are overcoming China’s lack of legal protection of property rights, its poor 
enforcement of laws, its inefficient market intermediaries which allows them to reach a level 
where they can actually compete with world leading firms. 
2.6.1. Possible Explanations for China’s Internationalization 
2.6.1.1. Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
One of the reasons that can explain this outward investment position of China is, in fact, the 
amount of FDI that China does absorb. Before China began the considerable amount of 
outflow FDI by the form of M&A, China collected all the information it could from the 
inflow FDI (Luo and Tung, 2007, Deng, 2009). With this, it allowed Chinese firms to contact 
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with international market players, to gain international experience and knowledge (even 
though occidental firms in China were reluctant to share the intrinsic knowledge of its 
process because of being afraid of losing their competitive position (Guan et al., 2006)). It 
also gave Chinese firms the possibility to create a network of international financial and 
operational firms. In fact, this learning from foreign investor companies was very important 
in the process of transforming China into a net investor rather than a recipient of investment 
(Tiezzi, 2014). 
Besides, this amount of inflow FDI acted as an accelerator and motivator for Chinese firms 
to go abroad because not only they were not competitive by world standards, but also they 
were starting to lose its own national market due to the penetration of other foreign 
companies (Witt and Lewin, 2007).  
2.6.1.2. Chinese Government role 
The poor situation of Chinese firms within its domestic market meant that they were losing 
for foreign companies. This made the government, through the action of National 
Development and Restructure Committee, as well as the National Export-Import Bank of 
China, to change its initial doctrine of “non-interference” (Clover, 2017), to stimulate 
companies to invest abroad in order to alleviate and compensate or even escape from a less 
efficient, less transparent and less encouraging Chinese environment (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
Therefore, Chinese government played a major role in its companies internationalization 
process (Zeng and Williamson, 2003) by facilitating the access to credit with very low interest 
rates and with value-added taxes. All of these came due to China’s strategy of “Go Global”, 
announced in 2001, and together with joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in that 
same year, are described as the cornerstones of China’s internationalization direction (Hitt et 
al., 2004). The effects of “Go Global” strategy continue to increase, year by year since its 
announcing, up to USD 3.5 billion in financial aid flows in 2013, 55% more than in 2009 
(Gurría, 2014). 
2.6.1.3. Resources Gap 
In spite of the competitive advantage of Chinese firms by having access to its home country 
resources and production capabilities and workforce, it has been proved not enough to face 
the competitive pressure of a western world filled with high-tech products with better quality. 
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Therefore, Chinese companies were left only with the option of acquiring such companies 
in foreign countries in order to fill the technological and energy need that their country had 
and continues to have (Larson, 2013). 
Consequently, China was focused in acquiring natural resources, high technology and oil 
reserves to face its national demand and to mitigate future international commodities price 
hikes (Pradeeph, 2011). 
According to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis' 2017 report, there 
is a big Chinese emphasis in clean-power investment: China expended $32 billion marking a 
60% year-on-year rise by investing in overseas renewable resources, becoming the largest 
world investor in clean energy. 
2.6.1.4. Foreign Exchange Reserves 
According to the Trade Economics database, China, in 20171, was the country with the 
largest foreign exchange reserves in the world growing a considerable stockpile of foreign 
reserves which makes the overseas investment easier to build up (Deng, 2009). Moreover, 
with Beijing’s new policies, Chinese firms can exchange money without register within the 
government (Tiezzi, 2014) which also facilitates the overseas investment. 
2.6.1.5. Protectionism 
Protectionism can be a driving factor to Chinese M&A wave. If countries do increase its 
protectionism measures to prevent the national consumption of Chinese goods, it becomes 
cheaper and easier to Chinese firms to move to the desire market’s country by acquiring a 
local-based firm, bypassing the taxes they would eventually face when exporting to that 
specific country.  
Therefore, according to Chakrabarti et al. (2009), the motivation for a country like China to 
merge or acquire a foreign company increases in correspondence with the level of free trade 
barriers that country has - underlining the advantages of shifting from a simple exporter to 
a national company acquirer (Tiezzi, 2014). 
                                                 
1 https://tradingeconomics.com/china/indicators. Accessed on 15th December 2017. 
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2.7. Cultural differences effects in M&A 
For everything that is being stated above and keeping in mind the news we are constantly 
receiving everyday about internationalization indicators going higher and higher, it is safe to 
say that we are, indeed, in a new era of globalization Hendrix, 2012). Therefore, having the 
levels of M&A continuing to be more important in terms of FDI, one of its main results is 
the increasing cultural indicator in the performance of this international merger wave (Black, 
2000). 
However, Kluckhon and Strodtbeck (1961) were the firsts to detect a Cultural influence on 
the performance, value creation and decision making. They specially addressed and endowed 
the force exercised on the behavior, the results and on the way of acting of a population by 
their shared values - their culture’s impact on their lives.  
By his turn, Hall (1976) complemented his study on the culture and started to analyze the 
differences between countries in terms of context and language. In his view, United States is 
a country with a type of communication that can be characterized as low-context culture 
since it is mainly impersonal and with less social hierarchy attention. On the contrary, Asian 
and Arab nations are an example of high-context cultures with more complex perception 
and consciousness of communication where society is more hierarchical and sensitive 
towards the population actions. 
Hence, it is possible for us to state that the importance of Culture in society actions is not a 
new topic recently developed neither is its influence on one country relation to another. 
Moreover, since those first studies, and because the performance of M&A is being deeply 
influenced by the integration process of two companies (Panibratov, 2017), numerous 
authors and researchers tried to measure the impact of Culture by further investigating the 
role of it in the world relations to conclude that there is no simple nor single approach to 
this topic. In fact, the vector and strength of influence remains open.  
2.7.1. Cultural differences - disparity from previous studies 
Up to today, the numerous studies about the actual effect of Cultural differences among 
companies from different countries which were integrated, are still needed to ascertain 
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whether the impact is positive, and the company thrives, or the clash of cultures is negative 
and makes the merger unsuccessful.  
According to Bjorkman et al. (2007) cultural differences can enhance the combination of 
both companies. This cultural clash can be seen as a possibility for companies to share an 
unique access to maximize valuable capabilities necessary to gain competitive advantage 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2009). They also state that countries with more cultural distant 
characteristics do perform better in the long run for arming the acquirer firms with better 
organizational synergies that will increase its competitive advantage in the international 
marketplace. Moreover, by being aware of the possible cultural shocks, companies might 
prepare themselves in a better way to face these obstacles, which might result in a more 
selective M&A process, reducing, in this way, the possibility to fail the international move. 
Furthermore, Liu (2017) analyzed 127 Chinese acquisitions of foreign companies and the 
impact of culture in its performance in a post-merger stage, stated that to face culturally 
Uncertainty Avoidance disparity, if the company strengths the cultural integration of 
overseas M&A, and really focus on it, it would benefit from cultural difference evidencing 
the positive effect of culture. 
On the other hand, the very same study states that after observing those 127 Chinese 
acquisitions from 2005 to 2012, the unsuccessful rate was proved to be connected precisely 
to the cultural distance between the countries in the merger deal and to the lack of interest 
from the acquirer company to integrate the targeted one. Also, Otterspeer (2016) concluded 
that cultural differences could increase the integration cost by the form of not sharing 
information, the existence of conflicts and not communicating with employees of the other 
national culture, which would result, therefore, in a decreasing of the performance of M&A. 
Ahern et al. (2015) in his turn, states that cultural differences actually diminish the intention 
of Merger and Acquirer a foreign company and, in the same way, that M&A tend to increase 
when they are between countries with a similar history, with similar language, with a similar 
culture. Moreover, Bauer et al (2014) stated that cultural fit between companies is mandatory 
in order to a M&A to succeed in its process and the level of integration is the core factor in 
a foreign acquisition and without it the effort for efficiently control and create synergies 
deeply becomes more complicated.  
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Moreover, from a survey conducted by Basford et al, in 2010, they concluded that companies 
with incompatible cultures with no regards to their mutual integration can lead to the risk of 
losses, a messy and prolonged integration period and to a lack of success in capturing merger 
values and synergies. 
Nevertheless, there is no consensus about the impact of cultural differences in business 
during an international M&A but one thing is clear among all the authors: the culture has 
indeed a very deep impact in the results of an international acquisition. According to Fealy’s 
et al survey, answered, in 2011, by 123 organizations from around the globe from different 
industries, 33% answered that the top reason for the international deal failure is “Cultural 
integration issues”, the second most cited in the survey. In addition, culture integration was 
indirectly connected to the other factors quoted by the respondents: 41% said that 
“Integration/implementation took longer than expected” was the main reason of a deal 
failure – which is a consequence of the lack of capacity to solve cultural problems-, and 30% 
answered that the main reason is the “insufficient attention/priority to workforce/people 
issues” – another consequence of different culture’s problems in a company.  
Furthermore, the very same survey also found out, by the analysis of the answers given, that 
most of the respondents considered loss of productivity, loss of key talent, failure to achieve 
intercompany synergies, decreased employee engagement and a delayed integration as the 
most serious consequences of unsuccessful cultural integration, evidencing the dependence 
of culture in the success of an international M&A. 
In conclusion, even if it is not absolutely known the impact of culture in business, culture is 
indeed a key factor to consider from a people’s perspective and also an overall business 
perspective, when performing an international deal merging two different organizations into 
an integrated one. 
2.7.2. Hofstede Dimensions 
Our study will try to prove and to understand those previous results by calculating the impact 
of the culture divergence in a cross-border acquisition specifically between Chinese groups 
and European target firms. 
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Furthermore, to measure the impact of culture in the performance variants, we could use 
one of three cultural databases: “GLOBE” – Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness created by House et al in 2004, which identifies nine cultural dimensions; the 
study of Nardon and Steers, from 2009, which elaborates five cultural dimensions; or the 
Cultural Dimensions Index created by Geert Hoftedee in 1980. 
Due to the fact it was one of the first cultural differences’ studies of our time, and the one 
still more accurate which, inclusive, continues to inspire the others, we will turn to Hofstede 
database, with the dimensions they there underlie to make us understand how powerful and 
strong the differences between the countries are and if, in any way, it is that what is 
contributing for the results the companies achieve. In this way, according to Geert Hofstede's 
book Culture’s Consequences (1980), with updates in the further editions in 2001 and 2011, 
he defines the 6 necessary dimensions to measure, in a more accurate way, the differences 
between cultures: 
 Individualism: “related to the integration of individuals into primary groups” – which 
analyses the cultures by the ties they have between individuals or, on the contrary, to the 
general group of society; 
 Masculinity: “related to the division of emotional roles between women and men” – 
which relates specific characteristics to a masculine society (competition driven, 
achievement, success) or feminine society (caring, protecting, loyalty); 
 Power distance: “related to the different solutions to the basic problems of human 
inequality” - It measures the acceptance of inequality distribution of power by the less 
powerful members of a society. In some cultures, “inequality is endorsed by the 
followers as much as by the leaders”; 
 Uncertainty avoidance: “related to the level of stress in a society in the face of an 
unknown future” – it observers the tendency a culture has to feel satisfied or unsatisfied 
with the ambiguity and unstructured situations; 
 Long term orientation: “related to the choice of focus for people's efforts: the future or 
the present and past” – this dimension stands for the commitment in a society to achieve 
future rewards by adapting to changing circumstances or, the same commitment but 
towards the focus on traditional virtues such as national pride, fulfilling social 
obligations, respect of heritage. 
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 Indulgence versus restraint: “related to the gratification versus control of basic human 
desires related to enjoying life” – which stands for measuring in which amount a society 
programs its members to directly follow strict social norms or, on the other hand, allows 
them to accomplish their human desires. 
Thus, we will then be able to conclude whether or not cultural mismatch and lack of cultural 
integration are a major factor when investing abroad and, therefore, conclude which 
dimensions have to be taken into a special account when Chinese Groups decide to expand 
their business by acquiring foreign enterprises. 
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3. Methodology and Sample 
The methodology of this dissertation will be divided into two different parts.  
The first one will be an univariate equation which will serve the objective of comparing the 
evolution of financial indicators between the companies selected from different European 
Union countries that were bought by an international Chinese group and its matching 
companies which did not have any Chinese third-party participation on their capital. All these 
variable values will be drawn from Zephyr and Amadeus databases.  
Then, the second part will focus on justifying, by the usage of multivariable model, how deep 
is the importance and the impact of cultural factors, among all factors, as the responsible 
variables of the acquired company development taken as result of the previous part. 
3.1. Univariate Analysis  
In this section, we will analyze three variables: Assets growth, Sales growth and ROA growth 
for both acquired companies and their matching ones. The analysis will focus on the values 
for the medians as the means are subjected to the effects of outliers.  
For each variable we will study its raw data and individual evolution, from the year before 
being acquired to three years after being so.  
Then, we will calculate the adjusted growth for each indicator, which will be drawn by 
subtracting the growth of the matching company to the acquired one. By doing so, we will 
remove the impacts from the economy changes as it is assumed that would affect the results 
of both groups simultaneously. 
The growing rate of total Assets from the period before being acquired to the 3 years after, 
between the acquired companies to their matching ones will allow us to know whether or 
not, the company structurally grew after being acquired, thanks to the injection of Chinese 
capital or, in the other hand, it did not grow in comparison to the matching companies that 
were not bought. 
In the same line of thought, we will compare the adjusted change rate of Return on Assets 
(ROA). ROA will be calculated by the value of each company’s EBIT – Earning Before 
Interests and Taxes – divided by each company’s total Assets for that given year. By doing 
so and keeping in mind that ROA measures how effectively a company is using its assets to 
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generate earnings2, we will be in the best position to check the performance situation of the 
given company and its difference to its matching one. 
Having all of these in mind, we will corroborate our first hypothesis which is:  
H1: “Whether or not, ceteris paribus, a company bought by a Chinese group, grew 
more than it would if it remained unanticipated by a third cross border party.”  
The equation which will be used can be expressed in the following manner:  
  ∆𝑿𝑨𝑱 = ∆𝑿 − ∆𝑿𝒎 (1) 
Where:  
𝑋 : is one of the following variables analyzed: ROA change, Asset’s growth, Sales growth, 
for the acquired company; 
𝑋𝑚 : is the same analyzed variable but for the «matching» company; 
𝑋𝐴𝐽 : is the adjusted version with the difference between those values’ variation which will 
tell us, if positive, that the company grew more because of being cross-border acquired or, if 
negative, that the growth was justified by a general boost of all economy itself and not 
because of the international acquisition.  
The variances (∆) will be calculated by analysing the values year by year, beginning one year 
immediately before the international deal (to see what the tendency was prior acquisition) up 
to three years immediately after the acquisition (to see if that tendency had any change). 
Moreover, the same will be applied for the matching companies, thus:  
∆ 𝑿𝒕∗ = 𝑿𝒕∗ − 𝑿𝒕−𝟏
 
  (2) 
∆ 𝑿𝒕∗
𝒎 =  𝑿𝒕∗
𝒎 − 𝑿𝒕−𝟏
𝒎 (3) 
                                                 
2 Anon. n.d. “Return On Total Assets - ROTA.” Retrieved 
(https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/return_on_total_assets.asp). 
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Where: 
t-1: represents the year before the acquisition 
t*: represents each year after the acquisition up to three years (t+1 ; t+2; t+3) 
 
In addition, whenever variable X assumes the independent variable of Assets or Sales, then 
in the formulas (2) and (3) prior defined, ∆ 𝑋𝑡∗ will represent the percentage of growth of 
those variables for the year t* when in comparison to the year t-1, i.e., 
 
∆ 𝑿𝒕∗ =
𝑿𝒕∗
𝑿𝒕−𝟏
 − 𝟏 (4) 
∆ 𝑿𝒕∗
𝒎 =
𝑿𝒕∗
     𝒎
𝑿𝒕−𝟏
         𝒎 − 𝟏 (5) 
3.2. Sample definition and data collection 
For this particular study, it is to the best of our belief, that the most effective course of 
analysis, as other authors concluded in their studies (Qian, 2017; Bauer et al, 2014), would 
be to retrieve the data from Zephyr and Amadeus Database, which is one of the biggest 
databases with a vast information about M&A from all over the world, including: financial 
status per year, percentage of acquisition, value of acquisition, all the information about the 
buyer, the target, the vendor, among numerous other information. 
Therefore, we will select, as a sample, companies from all the 28 states of the European 
Union which were bought, between 2007 and 2014, by Chinese companies either as a 
minority participation or a full control one. This time range was selected in order to allow us 
the possibility to properly measure the financial status in the year before the cross-border 
deal – which will be called, from this point on, «year t-1» - and the 3 years immediately after 
it. Therefore, with this time range and by comparing the evolution of the financial 
performance criteria between the last year in which the company did not have any significant 
participation of a Chinese player and the three years after it started to have, we expected to 
be in the capacity to properly understand how influential and important for the company 
was the event of being bought by a Chinese acquirer.  
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Therefore, the selection criteria of those companies will follow the principal obligation of 
being European Union countries’ companies and also from different sectors. Thus, between 
our selection, there will be represented companies from today’s most important sectors such 
as energy producers, technologies, car industries, pharmaceutical companies, tourism, and so 
on, to better analyse and deduct whether or not a specific company’s sector has a distinctive 
consequence from the Chinese acquisition when comparing to the others and if the 
acquisition has a more relevant result when analysed in different sectors. 
Thus, according to Zephyr database, the number of companies that fits all of the required 
criteria (time range acquisition, Chinese acquirer, European target) was 253. From those, and 
by searching in Amadeus database their BvD ID number - Bureau van Dijk ID number -, 
we took out from the sample the ones that: 
i) were not active for, at least, a three years period of post-acquisition; 
ii) were bought merely because of its assets and were dissolved right after one year 
of the acquisition; 
iii) which financial data was not freely available in any database whatsoever – 
Zephyr, Amadeus, Bloomberg. 
The final sample was then composed by 82 different European companies, which fulfilled 
all of those conditions. As shown in Table 1, the sample is composed by 16 different 
countries from European Union from which the majority number of deals are targeted in 
UK, Italy, France and Germany (22%, 16%, 13% and 11% of our sample, respectively). This 
can be explained by the fact that these countries are, according to World Bank data, 
economically speaking, the biggest countries in Europe and, therefore, from where Chinese 
companies can have more possibilities to find and to buy companies needed to fulfil their 
necessities – resources, technology, know-how, clients and suppliers’ portfolios, among 
others.  
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Table 1: List of analyzed acquisitions by country 
Countries 
Number of 
acquisitions 
% 
UK 18 22% 
Italy 13 16% 
France 11 13% 
Germany 9 11% 
Netherlands 5 6% 
Denmark 4 5% 
Sweden 4 5% 
Austria 3 4% 
Finland 3 4% 
Portugal 3 4% 
Spain 3 4% 
Belgium 2 2% 
Cyprus 1 1% 
Estonia 1 1% 
Lithuania 1 1% 
Poland 1 1% 
Total 82 100% 
   
Source: Own elaboration 
In addition, as Table 2 shows, most of the deals that compose our sample are from the most 
recent years with information available for the 3 years of post-acquisition period that we 
defined our sample to follow. Therefore, 54% of the deals used in this study were completed 
in 2014 and 2013. Besides, we can see a crescendo effect of number of acquisitions in Europe 
through the years. That crescendo only has a small discontinuity because of 2008’s peak 
probably connected to the economic crisis specially linked to Europe and US that allowed 
eastern economies to start to join western markets more freely. 
Nevertheless, we can also associate the fact our sample being formed mostly by most recent 
deals with the evidence that it is easier to access the financial information of the latest deals 
in Amadeus than it is with the oldest international deals. 
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Table 2: List of analyzed acquisitions by year 
Year 
Number of 
acquisitions 
% 
2014 22 27% 
2013 22 27% 
2012 17 21% 
2011 7 9% 
2010 2 2% 
2009 2 2% 
2008 8 10% 
2007 2 2% 
 82 100% 
Source: Own elaboration 
Furthermore, in table 3, we can conclude that in most the economic deals that we gather – 
72% - China acquired more than 50% of the target company leaving that company under 
Chinese control. 
Table 3: List of analyzed acquisitions by percentage acquired 
Acquisition 
Number of 
acquisitions 
% 
Majority 59 72% 
Not Majority 23 28% 
 82 100% 
Source: Own elaboration 
Moreover, our 82 companies’ selection covers most of the Standard Industrial Classification 
index3. Therefore, from the original 10 group codes, which were established by the United 
States Government in order to uniformly identify and group companies by their primary 
business objective, we group them into 7 groups as is shown in Table 4. 
 
                                                 
3 “Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are four-digit numerical codes assigned by the U.S. government 
to business establishments to identify the primary business of the establishment. The classification was 
developed to facilitate the collection, presentation and analysis of data; and to promote uniformity and 
comparability in the presentation of statistical data collected by various agencies of the federal government, 
state agencies and private organizations. The classification covers all economic activities.” 
https://siccode.com/en/pages/what-is-a-sic-code. Accessed on 20th February 2018. 
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Table 4: List of analyzed acquisitions by SIC Code 
SIC Code 
 
Definition 
 
Number of 
acquisitions 
% 
[0001;2000[ Agriculture and Mining 7 8% 
[2000;4000[ Manufacturing 43 52% 
[4000;5000[ Transportation & Public Utilities 15 18% 
[5000;6000[ Trade 8 9% 
[6000;7000[ Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 1 1% 
[7000;9000] Services 10 12% 
>9000 Public Administration 0 0% 
Source: Own elaboration 
This table above clearly illustrates that Chinese players do acquire more companies from 
Manufacturing sector than from the others (52% of our sample is characterizes by European 
companies of this sector). In addition, there is a big importance of the Transportation and 
Public Utilities sector with almost 18% of our companies’ sample. These comes along with 
the point 2.5.1.3. of this dissertation where we display the possibility of the lack of resources 
and infrastructures as being one explanation of China’s growing place in internationalization. 
3.2.1. Control Group 
However, besides those 82 companies affected by a cross-border deal, we matched each and 
every single one of those with a peer company from the same European country and with a 
similar structure (total Assets in the t-1 year between 70 to 130% of the original company), 
similar financial data (EBIT between 70 to 130% of the original company) and operational 
status (same three first digits of the acquired company SIC code) but without any 
intervention of other Chinese company whatsoever on their capital. Nevertheless, in the 
selection of the proxy company, whenever did not exist a group of 5 possible proxies to the 
acquired company, the criteria were extended, and the proximity was increased to 50 to 150% 
in comparison to the acquired one. In addition, if even after this increase, there was not a 
group of 5 different possibilities to be chosen one, the criteria “Same Country” was taken 
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away. All of these filters were added to guarantee that there was a considerable group of 
similar companies and the chosen one was, in fact, the most similar to the acquirer one.  
Having this in mind, we end up with a selection of 164 companies from 16 different 
European countries – 82 acquired by a Chinese company and 82 control companies that 
were not acquired by a Chinese company. 
In this way, we will truly distinguish the effect of a M&A by company and by sector through 
the years from the situation in which neither an acquisition nor a merge happened with one 
where it actually did, and only then we will be able to measure the impact of such 
international move. 
3.3. Descriptive Analysis  
Table 5 displays the differences between the acquired companies we selected and their 
matching companies – the control group – for the main structural and operational variables 
– Assets, EBIT, Operating Profit and ROA. The data gathered is related from the year 
immediately before the acquisition took place (t-1). 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and comparison between the two groups of companies 
This table reports the summary statistics for the total sample of 84 firms for the acquired group plus 84 firms for the control 
group. The sample period begins in 2007 and ends in 2014. The variables Assets, EBIT, Sales, ROA (which is computed 
by the ratio between EBIT and Assets) are referred to the year before the acquisition. Panel C presents the difference 
between the acquired company and its matching non-acquired one. All values presented are in thousands of US dollars. 
The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively, for the Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test (medians) and the T-student test (means). ROA values are shown in percentage (%). Assets, EBIT and Sales values 
are in thousands of euros. “Obs” column represents the number of companies from our sample with data available. 
Variables 
Descriptive statistics  
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
Panel A:  
Acquired Companies 
      
Assets 82 4 906.73 19 401.89 0.05 155 125.23 38.65 
EBIT 79 490.39 2 568.33 -458.35 22 093.09 1.24 
Sales 72 5 206.58 31 323.17 0.01 265 108.81 98.67 
ROA 80 -3.01% 34.81% -173.53% 75.74% 3.90% 
Panel B:  
Matching Companies 
     
 
Assets  82 6 042.17 23 284.08 0.04 180 220.51 42.57 
EBIT  82 797.52 4 024.36 -486.77 33 451.29 1.32 
Sales 72 3 325.23 9 413.85 0.03 52 291.27 46.15 
ROA   82 -0.16% 27.42% -147.64% 75.91% 4.58% 
Panel C:  
Adjusted Variables 
     
 
Assets - -1 135. 45 - - - 0.37 
EBIT - -337.38 - - - -0.46 
Sales - -1 891. 44 - - - 0.65 
ROA - -2.23% - - - -0.15% 
Source: Own elaboration 
By the direct observation of the values of the table, some conclusions may be drawn. First, 
our sample gathers a vast range of companies with different sizes. That can be seen by the 
massive distance between the minimum value and the maximum value and the discrepancy 
between the mean and the median results. 
Then, as it was defined in our criteria in the previous section, our sample was constructed 
with the intent of having matching companies that were the most similar that could be 
possible to our original acquired companies. Although the observation of the mean values 
may mislead to a different conclusion (since the mean is an average value affected by the 
existence of outliers), if we take the median for each of the variables analyzed, we can deduct 
that similarity may have been reached as the values are not statistically different between both 
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panels A and B as the t-test and the Wilcoxon Ranksign test proved that the mean and median 
differences were not statistically different from 0.  
Even though the t-test’s results were not that clarifying about the similarity between 
variables, and since there is a big discrepancy between our variables, our analysis will tend to 
rely more on the medians. Therefore, according to the p-values for each of the variables’ 
medians got from the Wilcoxon Signrank test, we can conclude that the medians for all the 
variables are statistically different from 0 for a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%. In 
addition, when we conducted the same test to prove the similarity between the same variable 
in panel C, we reached the conclusion intended: for the values from the year before being 
acquired, the company and its matching company were statistically similar in terms of Assets, 
EBIT and ROA.  
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4. Results – Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 6 reports the raw and adjusted growth of assets and sales and the raw and adjusted 
change on ROA after the acquisition, when compared with the year before the acquisition. 
In order to exclude the impact of outliers in the means the values in our sample were 
winsorized at 5% (95%).  
Table 6: Companies’ Performance change and Structure growth analysis 
This table reports the summary statistics for the total sample of 84 firms for the acquired group plus 84 firms for the control 
group. The sample period begins in 2007 and ends in 2014. The variables Assets, Sales, ROA (which is computed by the 
ratio between EBIT and Assets) are referred to the year before the acquisition. The acquired group column is presented as 
“Raw Variable”. The “Adjusted Variable” column presents the difference between the acquired company and its matching 
non-acquired one. The variables Assets and Sales are measured as percentages (%), since they are representing the growth 
against the year before being acquired. In the same line of thought, since ROA, ROS - Return on Sales - (EBIT/Sales) and 
Asset Turnover (Sales/Assets) are representing ratios, the comparison against the year t-1 is analyzed in per cent points 
(p.p.).  
Number of observations are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level, respectively, for the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (medians) and the T-student test (means). 
 Raw Variable Adjusted Variable 
 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 
Assets 
(%) 
Mean 
26.70*** 
(82) 
45.64*** 
(80) 
82.80*** 
(57) 
18.51*** 
(82) 
30.16*** 
(80) 
44.14*** 
(52) 
Median 
8.58*** 
(82) 
14.45*** 
(80) 
20.17***  
(57) 
-0.63 
(82) 
3.00* 
(80) 
20.47** 
(52) 
Sales  
(%) 
Mean 
10.23** 
(67) 
64.27** 
(68) 
98.08 ** 
(48) 
5.42  
(63) 
58.39** 
(62) 
80.19* 
(37) 
Median 
3.43 
(67) 
7.56** 
(68) 
14.12** 
(48) 
4.93 
(63) 
12.36 
(62) 
-5.19 
(37) 
∆ROA 
(p.p.) 
Mean 
-2.05 
(82) 
-0.10 
(80) 
3.85 
(57) 
-3.28 
(82) 
-2.03 
(80) 
2.09 
(52) 
Median 
-1.54 
(82) 
-0.19 
(80) 
0.02 
(57) 
-0.06 
(82) 
0.85 
(80) 
1.21 
(52) 
∆𝑹𝑶𝑺 
 (p.p) 
Mean 
-8.44*** 
(66) 
-0.18 
(68) 
0.17 
(45) 
-5.32 
(62) 
-4.38 
(62) 
0.99 
(36) 
Median 
-0.99* 
(66) 
-0.07 
(68) 
-0.39 
(45) 
-1.61 
(62) 
0.17 
(62) 
-0.13 
(36) 
∆
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔
𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕
 
(p.p) 
Mean 
8.34 
(67) 
4.65 
(67) 
-0.75 
(44) 
16.45* 
(63) 
19.87* 
(62) 
-2.16 
(36) 
Median 
-2.27 
(67) 
-1.89 
(67) 
-3.68 
(44) 
1.88 
(63) 
1.35 
(62) 
8.21 
(36) 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Therefore, in Table 6, we can directly see that the acquired companies’ assets grew 
significantly through the years even when adjusted with the growth occurred on non-
acquired companies. However, when we look to the adjusted growth rate, this growth is 
significantly more positive year by year, demonstrating that was in fact a bigger structural 
growth of acquired companies’ assets when compared to the non-acquired ones for the three 
years after the acquisition took place. In addition, when we apply the t-test to the change of 
growth rate of Assets, the results show us that all of the Adjusted Asset Growth rates are 
statistically different from 0, with a significance level of 1%. Moreover, when we conducted 
the Wilcoxon sign-rank (Mann-Whitney) test, we came along with the same conclusion, the 
adjusted median of the growth change is statistically different from 0 at a significance level 
of 5% for the year 3. 
Likewise, when we analyze the growth of sales for the same period of time, we find similar 
conclusions as we did with the assets. The sales’ growth for acquired companies are always 
positive for both mean and median results reaching a mean increase of almost 98.08% upon 
the 3rd year when compared to the year prior the acquisition. However, when we look to the 
adjusted sales variable, we observe that the median results are no statistically significant and 
inclusive there is a reduction of the sales growth when compared to the control group. On 
the other hand, our mean values continue to be statistically relevant for the second and third 
year of Sales growth when compared to year before acquisition. Therefore, according to t-
test applied to the sales growth, for the second year and third after being acquired, the 
acquired companies see their sales grow more than their proxy and non-acquired companies, 
which is not in concordance with the results from the Adjusted Sales growth. 
However, regarding ROA change, the situation is quite different from the previous variables. 
In this case, when we apply the significance tests, they fail to prove the statistical relevance 
of ROA’s variances for both Raw and Adjusted variables for the analyzed period. Therefore, 
we cannot analyze the evolution since they are not statistically relevant. This may be 
explained by the fact that acquired companies do see their assets grow but in the same 
proportion as they see their incomes, which in the end result in the same ratio of profitability. 
This is sustained by the statistically insignificant results from both Asset Turnover ratio and 
Operating Income Margin. 
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Nevertheless, with this table and all the comments and tests previous done in this section, 
we can also conclude that, the Chinese participation in European companies’ capital, does 
not have a negative effect in their financial performance. At the end they may see their 
company remain with the same rentability but with a much larger structure of sales and assets. 
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5. Multivariable Analysis 
  
Once our first hypothesis is tested and proved – and we will know that being acquired 
enabled those companies to thrive more than they actually would if they have remained non-
acquired –, or, on the other hand, rejected, we will study how important are differences in 
culture between both parties of the international deal on their financial and structural 
performance. 
Therefore, we will use, as for the second part of this study methodology, a Multiple Linear 
Regression to verify our second Hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2.1: Culture differences has influence on the financial and structural 
performance of the acquired companies.  
Hypothesis 2.2: A specific trait of cultural differences influences the financial and 
structural performance of the acquired companies. 
In this section our multivariable model will still include the two groups for two time periods 
in which one of the considered groups is subjected to a change between those time periods 
and the other group is not. If we consider the “change” as “being acquired”, the “two time 
periods” as the “years before being acquired and the years after” and “the two groups” as 
the “companies acquired and its matching companies”, we realize this model was the most 
effective way to measure these variables importance. In addition, by doing aforesaid type of 
comparison, this econometric model eliminates the changes in the economic environment 
since such changes could affect all the companies, acquired or not, in the same way justifying 
every increase in performance, when we do not want such attribution. 
Hence, our multivariable model can be defined as the following two expressions: 
𝑿𝒊 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑫𝑨 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑪𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑫𝑨 ∗  𝑪𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇 + 𝜺  (6) 
𝑿𝒊 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑫𝑨 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑪𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑪𝟐 +  𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑪𝟑 + 𝜷𝟓 ∗ 𝑪𝟒 +  𝜷𝟔 ∗
𝑪𝟓 + 𝜷𝟕 ∗ 𝑪𝟔 + 𝜷𝟖 ∗ 𝑫𝑨 ∗ 𝑪𝟏 + 𝜷𝟗 ∗ 𝑫𝑨 ∗ 𝑪𝟐 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎 ∗ 𝑫𝑨 ∗ 𝑪𝟑 +
 𝜷𝟏𝟏 ∗ 𝑫𝑨 ∗ 𝑪𝟒 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 ∗ 𝑫𝑨 ∗ 𝑪𝟓 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑 ∗ 𝑫𝑨 ∗ 𝑪𝟔 + 𝜺   (7)  
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Where:  
𝑿𝒊 : is one of the following variables analyzed: ROA Change, Asset’s growth, Sales growth, 
for the acquired company for the first three years after (i = t+1, t+2, t+3) 
𝜶 ;  𝜷: are the parameters of the relationship between our Dependent Variable and 
Independent ones 
𝑫𝑨 : is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a company was acquired by a Chinese 
group and 0 when it was not. This variable controls for differences in constant performance 
between acquired companies and the control group – non-acquired companies. 
𝑪𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇 : is continuous variable which measures the aggregated Hofstede cultural difference 
between the country from which a company was acquired (or from which a similar non-
acquired company is) and China. The larger is this indicator, the larger the cultural difference 
is. 
𝑫𝑨 ∗ 𝑪𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇 : is an interaction term between our two defining variables. Its coefficient 
represents the combined effect of a company being acquired and its cultural aggregated 
difference against China. 
𝑪𝒊 : are cultural independent variables in which i=1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6 represent in the same order 
the 5 Cultural Distance indicators measured by Hosftede: Individualism, Masculinity, Power 
Distance, Uncertainty avoidance, Long-Term Orientation, Indulgence versus restraint. 
Again, the bigger the indicators are, the bigger is the difference against China. 
𝑫𝑨 ∗ 𝑪𝒊 : is an individual interaction term to each one of the cultural indicators (i) to specify 
which cultural difference has more influence in the measure of our dependent variable. 
𝜺 : is the error term. 
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5.1. Independent Variables 
In terms of our financial independent variables, we will use databases such as Zephyr and 
Amadeus. 
In addition, when collecting all the information we need for Cultural Variables we will adopt 
formulas used by many past studies from multiple authors. 
Cultural Distance will be defined as Wieke Otterspeer (2016) did using Hofstede Formula: 
𝑪𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 =
𝟏
𝟔
√∑ (𝑆𝐴,𝑖 − 𝑆𝑇,𝑖)
26
𝑖=1   (8) 
Where:  
𝑆𝐴,𝑖 : represents the acquirer score on cultural dimension i: Individualism, Masculinity, Power 
Distance, Uncertainty avoidance, Long-Term Orientation, Indulgence versus restraint; 
𝑆𝑇,𝑖 : represents the target score on cultural dimension i (the same dimensions defined 
before) 
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6. Estimation Results 
 
The results of the estimations are presented on Table 7 and they are clear about the 
importance of the time change when we want to analyse the influence of cultural distance: 
for both ROA Growth and Sales Growth, the years t+1 and t+2 are not statistically 
significant when we analyse the influence of Cultural difference against China. 
 
Table 7: The effect of aggregated Cultural Difference against China in the analyzed 
variables 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and its aggregated 
cultural difference against China (represented by the continuous (Cdiff variable) which agglomerates the difference 
measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long-Term 
Orientation, Indulgence versus Restraint) expressed by the interaction DA ∗  Cdiff.  
In addition, the models (1) to (9) are divided by our 3 main dependent variables in groups of 3. Each group represents the 
yearly growth rate from the year prior the acquisition took place, respectively t+1, t+2, t+3 per Dependent Variable. 
The more reduced number of observations in models (3), (6) and (9) are also justified by this temporal criteria of the models 
since for more recent years (t+3) the data is not always available.  
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
 a) ASSETS GROWTH b) SALES GROWTH  c) ROA CHANGE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DA 
-4.847* 
(2.838) 
-5.371* 
(3.296) 
-17.637 
(11.993) 
-0.405 
(2.053) 
0.881 
(2.320) 
4.941** 
(2.310) 
0.373 
(0.434) 
-0.355 
(0.430) 
-0.590 
(0.385) 
Cdiff 
0.014 
(0.124) 
0.035 
(0.143) 
0.035 
(0.501) 
0.030 
(0.089) 
0.028 
(0.102) 
0.042 
(0.097) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
DA ∗ Cdiff 
0.353** 
(0.181) 
0.396* 
(0.210) 
1.304 * 
(0.763) 
0.042 
(0.133) 
-0.033 
(0.150) 
-0.300** 
(0.149) 
-0.024 
(0.028) 
0.020 
(0.027) 
0.042* 
(0.025) 
Constant -0.156 
(1.941) 
-0.388 
(2.245) 
-0.288 
(7.872) 
-0.354 
(1.382) 
-0.318 
(1.588) 
-0.574 
(1.536) 
-0.071 
(0.297) 
0.097 
(0.293) 
0.069 
(0.261) 
Nº 
Observation
s 
164 162 118 164 162 118 164 162 114 
R-Squared 0.063 0.066 0.069 0.063 0.066 0.069 0.006 0.008 0.051 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
However, when we look to the year t+3, for the same dependent variables ROA and Sales 
Growth, we now find a significant influence of the interaction Variable DA ∗  Cdiff proving 
that the cultural difference against China starts to be influential in acquired companies only 
after a period of 3 years has passed since the acquisition. This can be explained with the fact 
that during the acquisition, both companies, the acquirer and the acquired, want to make the 
international transaction as smooth as possible leaving the emergence of the cultural 
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differences, affecting the way business are conducted, for a further period in time. On the 
other hand, it is also a viable explanation the fact that cultural differences may take time to 
be incorporated on both sides of acquisition deal, postponing the effects of those same 
differences. 
On the other hand, if we analyse the column of the Assets Growth, we conclude that this 
variable is, by far, the most clearly affected one by the acquisition by a Chinese company. 
This is consistent with the univariate analysis done in section 4 of this dissertation where we 
saw the superior growth in the asset structure of an acquired company when compared to its 
proxy non-acquired.  
Nevertheless, and since the multivariable analysis consists in a much more efficient tool to 
picture the reality of a company, we can indeed conclude that the differences in culture have, 
in fact, a consequence in ROA, Assets and Sales growth. This is consistent with the findings 
of Bjorkamn et al. (2007)  
Moreover, since we have already proved the impact that cultural difference, in an aggregated 
way, has in ROA change, Sales and Assets growth, we need now to specify which indicator 
of culture has a deeper influence in our financial performance indicators.  
Therefore, in tables 8, 9 and 10 we broke down the cultural difference variable “ Cdiff”, 
previously used, into the 6 cultural indicators that were being combined: Individualism, 
Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty avoidance, Long-Term Orientation, Indulgence 
versus restraint. However, instead of analysing the 3 years post the acquisition, we focus our 
analysis on the 2nd year after being acquired in order to be more efficient in analysing the 
effects of culture in an acquisition. This decision was also supported with the fact that in the 
first year, the results are not that clear, since it is too close to the international acquisition; 
while in the third year, because of having less observations, could make the significance of 
our study diminish, therefore, the study of the second year was the best option to draw 
conclusions from.  
As we can see from the observation of the table 8, when we focus on the Assets Growth, it 
is the difference in the Cultural indicator of Masculinity, defined by Hofstede, that most 
statistically influences acquired companies to witness their assets grow more than they would 
if they have remained non-acquired by Chinese players. This indicator measures what drives 
a society - if it points a bigger score to a country, that would mean that there is an inherent 
motivation to compete, to achieve the best results possible in order to always pursue, from 
the very beginning in school until the throughout of organisational life, success above all 
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things. This is a more “Masculine” society and it is how Hofstede Index, with an attribution 
of 66 points (against a mean of 40 for the analysed European countries), defines China. On 
the other hand, a low score in the Masculinity indicator would mean that the society is more 
“Feminine” which would imply that the dominant values deep-rooted are not success and 
superiority but the quality of life itself without having to stand out from the group. Therefore, 
against the general perception that we may have, what this study tells us is that, ceteris paribus, 
if China, a “Masculine” defined society, acquires companies from European countries 
characterized as being more “Feminine” (such as from the north of Europe –Denmark, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden - who have the lowest score in this indicator), the possibility 
to see the acquired company structurally thrive in the post-acquisition years, is statistically 
more significant, because of cultural Masculinity difference, when compared to the same 
companies, from the same Nordic countries but without any international acquisition. This 
result come in the same line with Chakrabarti et al. (2009) which concluded from their study 
the positive role differences in culture have in the financial and structural performance of 
acquired companies. 
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Table 8: The effect of Cultural Differences in the Assets growth 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and the effect of 
each cultural difference indicator against China, measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance (DPDI)   
Individualism (DIDV), Masculinity (DMAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (DUAI), Long-Term Orientation (DLTO) and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint (DIND), on the Assets Growth for the second year after being acquired.  
In addition, the models (1) to (6), respectively from the order of indicators previously presented, represent the regression 
done to each cultural indicator individually. 
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.072 
(0.825) 
-0.349 
(1.520) 
0.160 
(0.405) 
0.318 
(0.552) 
0.129 
(0.662) 
-0.022 
(0.645) 
 DPDI 
0.006 
(0.020) 
     
DA* DPDI 
0.028 
(0.029) 
     
 DIDV  
0.010 
(0.028)     
DA* DIDV  
-0.012 
(0.036) 
    
 DMAS   
-0.000 
(0.014) 
   
DA* DMAS   
0.051** 
(0.021) 
   
 DUAI    
-0.005 
(0.015) 
  
DA* DUAI    
-0.028 
(0.021) 
  
 DLTO     
0.001 
(0.021) 
 
DA* DLTO     
0.026 
(0.031) 
 
DIND      
0.001 
(0.021) 
DA* DIND      
0.026 
(0.031) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.038 0.020 0.085 0.052 0.029 0.059 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Furthermore, when we look to table 9 Sales growth models, we observe something different. 
The first two years after the acquisition takes place, there is not any difference in any cultural 
indicator that is statistically relevant in influencing the way Sales growth change, as the 
annexe 3 assists to conclude. This comes along with the conclusions we drew in the 
previously analysis where we said that only after 3 years have passed, cultural differences 
actually influence Sales growth. In addition, with annexe 4 we confirm that the cultural 
distance only influences Sales on the 3 year after the acquisition and in this case, it is the 
Long-Term Orientation difference. This indicator measures the links a society has to its past 
and its importance in defining the present and the future. A high score in this indicator (such 
as China has – 87 face a mean of 55 from our analysed European countries) means the culture 
is very pragmatic and people show an ability to change and adjust their traditions if that will 
result in a better future with a bigger possibility to achieve better results. Differently, if a 
country has a lower score in this indicator (such as Finland, Norway, Portugal, Poland), that 
would suggest the culture is rather normative and the people exhibit greater respect for 
stablished traditions without great prepare for the future. In the end what this table implies 
is whenever China acquires a company from a country with whom it has a bigger difference 
in Long Term Orientation, that same difference will actually result in a statistically significant 
possibility of decrease the level of Sales when compared to a similar company that was not 
acquired by China. Moreover, this conclusion comes in concordance to what a survey 
conducted by by Basford et al, in 2010 concluded about the risks and the possibility of a lack 
of success in the financials of a company when the acquired and the acquirer companies 
come from far cultural different countries. 
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Table 9: The effect of Cultural Differences in the Sales growth 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and the effect of 
each cultural difference indicator against China, measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance (DPDI)   
Individualism (DIDV), Masculitinity (DMAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (DUAI), Long-Term Orientation (DLTO) and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint (DIND), on the Sales Growth for the second year after being acquired. 
In addition, the models (1) to (6), respectively from the order of indicators previously presented, represent the regression 
done to each cultural indicator individually. 
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.042 
(0.496) 
-0.349 
(0.914) 
0.155 
(0.258) 
0.253 
(0.351) 
0.143 
(0.456) 
-0.072 
(0.407) 
 DPDI 
0.004 
(0.013) 
  
   
DA* DPDI 
0.012 
(0.018) 
  
   
 DIDV 
 0.009 
(0.017) 
    
DA* DIDV 
 0.011 
(0.022) 
    
 DMAS 
  -0.002 
(0.010) 
   
DA* DMAS 
  -0.016 
(0.014) 
   
 DUAI 
   -0.004 
(0.009) 
  
DA* DUAI 
   -0.011 
(0.013) 
  
 DLTO 
    -0.001 
(0.015) 
 
DA* DLTO 
    -0.008 
(0.021) 
 
DIND 
     0.006 
(0.012) 
DA* DIND 
     0.005 
(0.018) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.026 0.030 0.034 0.034 0.016 0.021 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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For the last variable, our performance variable ROA, the results represent a different 
situation from the previous ones. In the first year after the acquisition, no significance was 
found in the difference in culture that would influence the ROA change. However, when we 
pass to the second year after the acquisition, as we can see in Table 10, then we have 2 cultural 
indicators that are statistically relevant: Uncertainty Avoidance and Individualism. The first 
of these two cultural indicators is related to what extent a society accepts the uncertainty of 
the future or, in the other case, tries to avoid it by the usage of strict rules and laws and 
deeper roots of intolerance towards unorthodox behaviour and ideas. In this case, it is China 
who has the lowest score – demonstrating that Chinese people are indeed more pragmatic in 
life with a bigger acceptance of the ambiguity of the future (they score here 30 points when 
the mean of Europe is 67 verifying the inner urge of European countries to control the 
uncertainty). Thus, whenever China acquires a company from a country where the 
Uncertainty Avoidance level is more different of, our model tells us that, statistically, after 
two years of being acquired, the ROA of the acquired company will decrease. This conclusion 
is consistent with Liu (2017) who stated that Uncertainty Avoidance disparity between China 
and the acquired companies’ country would result in weakening the company after being 
acquired. 
In terms of Individualism, this indicator measures the degree of interdependence a society 
cultivates among its population. Therefore, when we have a country as China with a score of 
20 we can support the fact that Chinese population act deeply in the interests of the group 
rather of their own, which means that Chinese society is rather a Collectivist one (when we 
compare to the mean of Europe, the score is 63, demonstrating that European countries are 
much more Individualists than China). Thus, and with the observation of table 11, we can 
conclude that when a company, from a country with an Individualism level far different from 
China, is acquired by a Chinese player, in the second year after the acquisition takes place, 
with a statistically significance of 10%, it will see their ROA grow. This ending contrast the 
conclusions of Ahern (2015) where he stated that the distance in Individualism would result 
in higher costly frictions between the two firms and would reduce the acquired company 
results. 
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Table 10: The effect of Cultural Differences in the ROA Change 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and the effect of 
each cultural difference indicator against China, measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance (DPDI)   
Individualism (DIDV), Masculinity (DMAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (DUAI), Long-Term Orientation (DLTO) and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint (DIND), on the ROA Change for the second year after being acquired.  
In addition, the models (1) to (6), respectively from the order of indicators previously presented, represent the regression 
done to each cultural indicator individually. 
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.217 
(0.105) 
0.426** 
(0.192) 
0.059 
(0.054) 
-0.069 
(0.071) 
-0.081 
(0.084) 
0.191** 
(0.083) 
 DPDI 
-0.004* 
(0.003) 
  
   
DA* DPDI 
0.005 
(0.004) 
  
   
 DIDV 
 -0.007** 
(0.004) 
    
DA* DIDV 
 0.008* 
(0.005) 
    
 DMAS 
  -0.000 
(0.002) 
   
DA* DMAS 
  0.001 
(0.003) 
   
 DUAI 
   0.004** 
(0.002) 
  
DA* DUAI 
   -0.005** 
(0.003) 
  
 DLTO 
    0.005* 
(0.003) 
 
DA* DLTO 
    -0.005 
(0.004) 
 
DIND 
     -0.005 
(0.003) 
DA* DIND 
     0.006* 
(0.004) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.022 0.029 0.004 
 
0.032 
 
0.024 
 
0.027 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In addition, even though the other variables seem not to be statistically relevant for any 
confidence level of 1%, 5% or 10%, we cannot prove that those indicators do not have any 
impact on the performance and structure variables. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Giving the significant advance of China internationalization over the world’s major 
companies (CNBC, 2017), our dissertation objective was understanding whether or not being 
acquired by Chinese company, would make the acquired company stand out among the 
others by growing more their assets and their profitability, or, on the other hand, would make 
the acquired company collapse. 
For that we limited our investigation to companies acquired in Europe, between 2007 and 
2014, since it is the continent which, according to Bloomberg (2018), in the last decade, saw 
45% more china-related activity than the US for the exact same period. 
To do so, we have selected 82 different companies that were acquired in the defined time-
frame, from 16 European countries, representing all the SIC codes groups. 
In addition, with the objective increasing the accuracy of our conclusions, for these 82 
acquired companies, we selected an extra 82 non-acquired companies but similar in 
everything else to the acquired ones. 
From the univariate analysis we were able to uncover several main conclusions. 
First, the level of the Assets and Sales grew in a positive way for both acquired and non-
acquired companies. However, when we looked to the adjusted growth rate, we realize that 
were acquired companies that saw their assets grow more. In addition, the level of 
significance obtained may suggest that being acquired by Chinese companies, boosts the 
growth of assets for the years of the post-acquisition. 
Second, regarding ROA, for the first year after being acquired, we noticed a reduction of 
ROA from companies that were acquired when compared to the control group. This may 
suggest that, as Richard Harroch wrote for Forbes in 2015, how difficult is to create synergies 
and harmony between the acquirer and the acquired. For the second and third year after the 
acquisition, the development is positive which may support the idea that acquired companies 
overcome the destabilization of being acquired with time. However, these results were not 
statistically significant possibly because of the lack of observations in the t+3. 
In our multivariable analysis, we drew also certain important conclusions: 
First the results are clear about the existence of an impact of the difference in culture between 
the acquired company’s country and China. In terms of Assets Growth, as in the univariate 
analysis, this is the variable in which the cultural differences do influences most, from the 
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very first year after being acquired. However, for the case of Sales and ROA, that impact is 
only statistically significant upon the 3rd year after acquisition. 
Second, we conclude that in terms of Assets, it is the difference in the Masculinity level that 
influences the most the acquired companies to structurally grow – as Chakrabarti et al. (2009) 
concluded. As for the growth level of Sales, it is the Long-Term Orientation difference that 
most influences the Sales of the acquired company to reduce – which is in the line with by 
Basford et al, in 2010. In terms of ROA change indicator, it is the Uncertainty Avoidance 
and Individualism indicators that most influence ROA of acquired companies. This ending 
contrast the conclusions of Ahern (2015). 
Despite the conclusions that were possible to draw from this dissertation, some limitations 
have to be enlightened. 
Firstly, since an acquisition is an extensive event, we would need a bigger interval of time to 
better evaluate the consequences of such complex event that is an acquisition.  
Secondly, with a bigger time-frame of acquisitions and data it would be very favorable for 
the study the usage of 1) more cultural indicators and 2) financial indicators. 
In the end, if these limitations are taken care of, it can result in a study where we can, as most 
confident we can be, predict what would happen to a specific company that was acquired, 
just by knowing in which country is that company from and what financial data had before 
the acquisition. This would facilitate and improve the international acquisitions all over the 
world. 
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Annexes   
Annex 1. The effect of Cultural Differences in the Assets growth for the first year 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and the effect of 
each cultural difference indicator against China, measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance (DPDI)  
Individualism (DIDV), Masculitinity (DMAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (DUAI), Long-Term Orientation (DLTO) and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint (DIND), on the Assets Growth for the first year after being acquired.  
In addition, the models (1) to (6), respectively from the order of indicators previously presented, represent the regression 
done to each cultural indicator individually. 
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.036 
(0.714) 
-0.111 
(1.313) 
0.063 
(0.349) 
0.069 
(0.478) 
0.032 
(0.572) 
0.022 
(0.559) 
 DPDI 
-0.346 
(0.992) 
     
DA* DPDI 
0.027 
(0.025) 
     
 DIDV  
0.003 
(0.024)     
DA* DIDV  
-0.010 
(0.031) 
    
 DMAS   
-0.000 
(0.018) 
   
DA* DMAS   
0.045*** 
(0.018) 
   
 DUAI    
-0.000 
(0.013) 
  
DA* DUAI    
-0.026 
(0.018) 
  
 DLTO     
0.001 
(0.018) 
 
DA* DLTO     
0.025 
(0.026) 
 
DIND      
0.001 
(0.017) 
DA* DIND      
0.038* 
(0.024) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.033 0.018 0.086 0.045 0.029 0.051 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Annex 2. The effect of Cultural Differences in the Assets growth for the third year 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and the effect of 
each cultural difference indicator against China, measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance (DPDI)   
Individualism (DIDV), Masculitinity (DMAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (DUAI), Long-Term Orientation (DLTO) and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint (DIND), on the Assets Growth for the third year after being acquired.  
In addition, the models (1) to (6), respectively from the order of indicators previously presented, represent the regression 
done to each cultural indicator individually. 
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.081 
(2.980) 
0.050 
(5.079) 
0.216 
(1.420) 
0.404 
(1.874) 
0.240 
(2.248) 
0.146 
(2.467) 
 DPDI 
0.009 
(0.073) 
     
DA* DPDI 
0.121 
(0.106) 
     
 DIDV  
0.004 
(0.924)     
DA* DIDV  
-0.033 
(0.118) 
    
 DMAS   
0.003 
(0.050) 
   
DA* DMAS   
0.173*** 
(0.073) 
   
 DUAI    
-0.005 
(0.052) 
  
DA* DUAI    
-0.080 
(0.072) 
  
 DLTO     
0.001 
(0.073) 
 
DA* DLTO     
0.111 
(0.104) 
 
DIND      
0.004 
(0.073) 
DA* DIND      
0.135 
(0.103) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.033 0.018 0.110 0.048 0.044 0.054 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Annex 3. The effect of Cultural Differences in the Sales growth for the first year 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and the effect of 
each cultural difference indicator against China, measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance (DPDI)   
Individualism (DIDV), Masculitinity (DMAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (DUAI), Long-Term Orientation (DLTO) and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint (DIND), on the Sales Growth for the second year after being acquired.  
In addition, the models (1) to (6), respectively from the order of indicators previously presented, represent the regression 
done to each cultural indicator individually. 
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.100 
(0.441) 
-0.449 
(0.780) 
0.234 
(0.229) 
0.285 
(0.308) 
0.099 
(0.395) 
-0.142 
(0.353) 
 DPDI 
0.006 
(0.011) 
  
   
DA* DPDI 
0.011 
(0.016) 
  
   
 DIDV 
 0.011 
(0.015) 
    
DA* DIDV 
 0.012 
(0.019) 
    
 DMAS 
  -0.007 
(0.008) 
   
DA* DMAS 
  -0.009 
(0.013) 
   
 DUAI 
   -0.005 
(0.008) 
  
DA* DUAI 
   -0.015 
(0.012) 
  
 DLTO 
    0.000 
(0.013) 
 
DA* DLTO 
    -0.000 
(0.018) 
 
DIND 
     0.009 
(0.011) 
DA* DIND 
     0.010 
(0.016) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.023 0.035 0.028 0.050 0.006 0.032 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Annex 4. The effect of Cultural Differences in the Sales growth for the third year 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and the effect of 
each cultural difference indicator against China, measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance (DPDI)   
Individualism (DIDV), Masculitinity (DMAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (DUAI), Long-Term Orientation (DLTO) and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint (DIND), on the Sales Growth for the second year after being acquired.  
In addition, the models (1) to (6), respectively from the order of indicators previously presented, represent the regression 
done to each cultural indicator individually. 
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.064 
(0.519) 
-0.200 
(0.859) 
0.107 
(0.257) 
0.209 
(0.322) 
-0.030 
(0.449) 
-0.177 
(0.447) 
 DPDI 
0.004 
(0.013) 
  
   
DA* DPDI 
0.009 
(0.019) 
  
   
 DIDV 
 0.005 
(0.015) 
    
DA* DIDV 
 -0.006 
(0.020) 
    
 DMAS 
  -0.001 
(0.009) 
   
DA* DMAS 
  -0.010 
(0.014) 
   
 DUAI 
   -0.004 
(0.009) 
  
DA* DUAI 
   0.004 
(0.013) 
  
 DLTO 
    0.004 
(0.014) 
 
DA* DLTO 
    -0.034** 
(0.019) 
 
DIND 
     0.008 
(0.013) 
DA* DIND 
     -0.023 
(0.019) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.025 0.017 0.027 0.018 0.082 0.038 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Annex 5. The effect of Cultural Differences in the ROA change for the first year 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and the effect of 
each cultural difference indicator against China, measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance (DPDI)   
Individualism (DIDV), Masculitinity (DMAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (DUAI), Long-Term Orientation (DLTO) and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint (DIND), on the ROA Change for the first year after being acquired.  
In addition, the models (1) to (6), respectively from the order of indicators previously presented, represent the regression 
done to each cultural indicator individually. 
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.044 
(0.108) 
0.350* 
(0.195) 
-0.009 
(0.054) 
-0.039 
(0.322) 
-0.090 
(0.085) 
0.047 
(0.020) 
 DPDI 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
  
   
DA* DPDI 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
  
   
 DIDV 
 -0.006 
(0.004) 
    
DA* DIDV 
 0.005 
(0.005) 
    
 DMAS 
  0.002 
(0.002) 
   
DA* DMAS 
  -0.002 
(0.003) 
   
 DUAI 
   0.002 
(0.002) 
  
DA* DUAI 
   -0.000 
(0.003) 
  
 DLTO 
    0.004 
(0.003) 
 
DA* DLTO 
    -0.006* 
(0.004) 
 
DIND 
     -0.001 
(0.003) 
DA* DIND 
     -0.004 
(0.004) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.001 0.020 0.005 0.011 0.018 0.020 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Annex 6. The effect of Cultural Differences in the ROA change for the third year 
This table displays the combined impact of a company being acquired (represented by the dummy DA) and the effect of 
each cultural difference indicator against China, measured in 6 different indicators: Power Distance (DPDI)   
Individualism (DIDV), Masculitinity (DMAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (DUAI), Long-Term Orientation (DLTO) and 
Indulgence Versus Restraint (DIND), on the ROA Change for the third year after being acquired.  
In addition, the models (1) to (6), respectively from the order of indicators previously presented, represent the regression 
done to each cultural indicator individually. 
Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.009 
(0.097) 
0.012 
(0.163) 
-0.013 
(0.047) 
-0.014 
(0.061) 
0.013 
(0.073) 
-0.015 
(0.081) 
 DPDI 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
  
   
DA* DPDI 
0.005 
(0.003) 
  
   
 DIDV 
 -0.001 
(0.003) 
    
DA* DIDV 
 -0.001 
(0.004) 
    
 DMAS 
  -0.000 
(0.002) 
   
DA* DMAS 
  0.003 
(0.002) 
   
 DUAI 
   -0.000 
(0.002) 
  
DA* DUAI 
   -0.001 
(0.002) 
  
 DLTO 
    -0.001 
(0.002) 
 
DA* DLTO 
    0.005 
(0.003) 
 
DIND 
     0.000 
(0.002) 
DA* DIND 
     0.002 
(0.003) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.045 0.017 0.035 0.023 0.040 0.020 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
